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Abstract  
 
This work intends to explore and provide an extension to the existing literature on 
earnings persistence by focusing on U.K. listed family firms. Prior literature has focused 
on the persistence associated with the earnings’ components, cash flows and accruals, 
with evidence suggesting that there is a difference in the persistence associated with 
each of the components. Sloan (1996) documents the Accrual´s Anomaly suggesting 
that market participants fixate on reported earnings and fail to price adequately the ac-
crual component of earnings. This generated the possibility of implementing an accru-
als-based investment strategy that would generate future abnormal returns. Other au-
thors, focused on the persistence of industry-wide and firm-specific earnings and their 
results suggest a higher persistence associated with the industry and a lower persistence 
associated with the firm (Brown & Ball, 1967; Hui, Nelson, & Yeung, 2016; Lev, 1983; 
Magee, 1974). These issues motivate further exploring and this work intends to study 
the pricing of earnings and earnings components while exploring at the industry level 
and extending it to the domain of family firms. We base the analysis on a sample of 
8,545 firm-year observations from London Stock Exchange (LSE) firms for the period 
of 2006-2013. This work is relevant since it contributes to the literature concerning (i) 
earnings components, on what may be the difference in the pricing of accruals and cash 
flows (ii) the difference in pricing across industry-wide earnings and firm-specific earn-
ings. We find evidence of earning´s underweighting, specifically on the cash flow com-
ponent of non-family firms. At the industry-level, our results suggest underweighting of 
firm-specific cash flows of non-family firms. Hence, an underweighting strategy would 
yield yearly abnormal returns of 1% on earnings, of 1.7% on the cash flows, and 1.4% 
on firm-specific cash flows. The results were statistically significant although off small 
economic meaning. 
 
Keywords: Earnings; Accruals; Cash flows; Abnormal Returns; Family 
Firms. 
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1 – Introduction  
 
Firm earnings can be defined as the summation of cash flows and accruals of a 
company. Cash flows stand for the company´s activity, such as cash inflows and cash 
outflows, while accruals are associated with the non-cash component of earnings by 
representing the allocation in time t or t+1, of both the receipts and disbursements that 
occurred in t-n and those expected to occur in t+1 (Monsen & Näsi, 2001). The objec-
tive of this work is to provide evidence on earnings persistence research field, specifi-
cally on the impact of earnings components and their mispricing among the U.K. family 
firms. To this end, it will be analyzed in detail the way market participants interpret 
information and price, with the available accounting information, earnings components 
of family and non-family firms. It will also be scrutinized how firm performance is af-
fected by firm ownership structure.  
Prior research on family firms provide heterogeneous results, arising three differ-
ent perspectives. The first standpoint is the underperformance of family firms (Lins, 
Volpin, & Wagner, 2013), the second is the overperformance of family firms (Wang, 
2006) and the third is, there are no significant differences between the performance of 
family firms and non-family firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Looking at the theories 
supporting each of these mixed results, we observe that the main pillars in which over-
performance supports itself are both the Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
the “Alignment Effect” (Wang, 2006) while the opposing counter-narrative is driven by 
the “Entrenchment Effect” (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988), managerial inefficiencies 
(Chandler Jr, 1990), the “Free Riding” (Bruce & Waldman, 1990) and predatory man-
agers (Morck & Yeung, 2003). The first motive of this study is the existence of this 
varied interpretations on family firm´s performance. 
The Accrual´s Anomaly was first discovered by Sloan (1996). It consists of a dif-
ference on the relative persistence of each of the earnings components. In this phenom-
enon, those companies who had a higher accrual (cash flow) magnitude in respect to 
earnings performance would turn out, in the future, to have a lower (higher) likelihood 
of earnings persistence. Market participants were unable to distinguish this difference in 
persistence associated with each of the earnings’ components leading to a future mis-
4 
 
pricing, in other words with this misjudgment after the disclosure of companies’ annual 
earnings, those who previously had earnings with high (low) accruals embedded, will 
turn out to have negative returns (abnormal positive returns) and this can be interpreted 
as investors are irrational forecasters (Soares & Stark, 2011). After Sloan (1996) many 
researchers became interested in studying this issue with the intent to discover if the 
market participants of other stock markets suffer from similar irrationalities. In the par-
ticular case of the U.K. recent studies suggest mixed evidence on the existence of an 
Accrual Anomaly. Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007) provide evidence that 
suggests the U.K. as one of the countries in which the Accrual´s Anomaly is more in-
tense. On the other hand, Soares and Stark (2009) shows evidence that is somewhat 
consistence with return predictability and profitable exploitation of the Accruals’ 
Anomaly but its intensity is questioned, suggesting it is only felt in small companies. In 
follow up research, Soares and Stark (2011) corroborates with his previous publication 
by finding little evidence on the existence of the Accrual´s Anomaly after controlling for 
risk and other variables, however they found signs of a Cash Flow´s Anomaly. More 
recently, Doukakis and Papanastasopoulos (2014) found evidence of mispricing, con-
sistent with the existence of the Accruals’ Anomaly. Overall, in the U.K, exist mixed 
evidence regarding stock return anomalies, being our second motive for the develop-
ment of this study. It seems pertinent to study this matter to know if these anomalies not 
only appear to exist, but to see if there are differences in the mispricing of family and 
non-family firms.  
We found interesting to study the impact of the industry and how it may affect 
differently both family and non-family firms. King (1966) found evidence of associa-
tion between earnings of the firm and the industry where the firm is inserted. More re-
cently, Hui et al. (2016) decomposed industry-wide earnings into industry-wide and 
firm-specific earnings, subsequently obtaining the industry-wide accruals and cash 
flows and firm-specific accruals and cash flows. The results suggest a different persis-
tence associated with each of these components, being the most persistent the industry-
wide cash flows and the least the firm-specific accruals. Regarding the industry-wide 
accruals and the firm-specific cash flows, at least in theory, it is unclear which one is 
the most persistence since a higher (lower) persistence is attributed to industry-wide 
(firm-specific) performance and a lower (higher) persistence is attributed to the accruals 
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(cash flows). Also, they found that the investors interpretation was an underreaction 
(overreaction) to the higher (lower) persistence of industry-wide (firm-specific) earn-
ings, resulting into a mispricing. The third motive of this study is to test, at the industry 
level, if family firms have significant differences when compared to non-family firms 
and verify if mispricing exists. 
Many researchers have been focusing on Accrual Anomaly and Cash flow Anoma-
ly (Doukakis & Papanastasopoulos, 2014; Pincus et al., 2007; Soares & Stark, 2009, 
2011), other researchers have been studying the industry earnings (Brown & Ball, 1967; 
Hui et al., 2016; King, 1966; Lev, 1983; Magee, 1974) and others have been studying 
how the ownership structure impacts firm´s performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Bruce & Waldman, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Morck & Yeung, 2003; Wang, 2006). 
Joining these themes together it seems interesting studying if there is earnings mispric-
ing of both family and non-family firms. 
This work intends to explore if (i) there are differences in the pricing of earnings 
between family and non-family firms; (ii) there are differences in the pricing of industry 
earnings and industry components between family and non-family firms. The period of 
this study is 8 years, starting in 2006 and ending in 2013. By excluding financial com-
panies, due to their different regulatory and operating environments, we obtained a final 
sample of 8,545 firm-year observations in which we will test these hypotheses. 
Our results suggest earning´s underpricing, specifically on the cash flow compo-
nent of non-family firms. An underweighting strategy on earnings and cash flows would 
yield yearly abnormal returns of 1% and 1.7% respectively. Regarding the industry, our 
results suggest underpricing of firm-specific cash flows only for non-family firms. 
Hence, an underweighting strategy on firm-specific cash flows would hold 1.4% ab-
normal returns. All the mentioned results were statistically significant although off 
small economic meaning. 
Throughout this work we will present different author perspectives and relevant 
definitions, enhanced by the existing literature and theories. The structure of this work 
is the following. Section 2 reviews prior related literature. Section 3 builds the research 
questions and its discussion. Section 4 introduces the sample, the methodology and the 
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variables used. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 produces the conclusions of 
the study.  
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2 – Literature Review 
 
In this section, a brief literature review on the earnings persistence topic will be 
provided. Furthermore, the issue of family firms and how it might have an impact on the 
pricing of accruals will also be discussed.  
 
2.1 – Earnings  
 
 Firm earnings are crucial for investors to assess firm´s performance. They are 
composed by two components, the cash flow element and the accrual element (Dechow, 
1994; Dechow, Kothari, & Watts, 1998). The cash flow component concerns the cash 
inflows and cash outflows of the company, while the accrual component concerns non-
observable cash outcomes that, beforehand, require estimates of future cash results, in 
other words, represent the liabilities and non-cash assets (Borges, 2015). According to 
Dechow (1994), to produce earnings two accounting principles must be followed, the 
matching principle and the revenue recognition principle. The first principle involves 
matching cash inflows with cash outflows while the second involves considering as 
revenue both the completed and uncompleted services where cash was not collected yet 
but is likely to be. These two principles help mitigating cash flow’s timing and match-
ing problems, arising in the accrual process. The objective is to, by incorporating the 
accruals, make earnings a more accurate reflection of firm´s performance when exclu-
sively compared to cash flows. In the literature, some authors defend the use of earnings 
instead of cash flows for a number of different reasons namely, when companies have 
long operating cycles, it diminishes the timing and matching problems due to the incor-
poration of accruals (Dechow, 1994), less information asymmetry for companies with a 
large ownership distribution (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995) and a stronger forecasting 
power because they incorporate the negative serial correlation of cash flow changes and 
include the accruals, being a better predictor than solely cash flows (Dechow et al., 
1998). Even though accruals can increase earnings´ forecasting power, in some circum-
stances it may be preferable to use just cash flows, such as in companies where the op-
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erating cycles are short and companies where opportunistic managers may manipulate 
accruals (Dechow, 1994). This indirectly leads to a lower persistence of accruals when 
compared to cash flows (Artikis & Papanastasopoulos, 2016). This accrual´s manipula-
tion may occur due to the accruals flexibility in financial reporting, as they derive from 
management cash flow’s judgments and estimates. In the literature authors justify the 
existence of accruals flexibility to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) and to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These princi-
ples are designed to be flexible, to a certain extent, due to its application in different 
industries and within different geographies (Barth, Cram, & Nelson, 2001; 
Subramanyam, 1996). However there is a trade-off, even though it can be applied with-
in different industries and geographies, it may allow opportunistic managers to manipu-
late earnings (Xie, 2001). Opportunistic managers throughout the selection of account-
ing procedures and accruals, may take advantage of this flexibility to distort the firm 
earning´s reality for varied reasons such as of their own interests, with the objective of 
obtaining personal advantages such as bonus (Dechow, 1994; Healy, 1985; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978) subsequently leading companies to report higher earnings 
(Weetman & Gray, 1991). Artikis and Papanastasopoulos (2016) suggests accruals as 
less persistence when compared to cash flows, one explanation can be due to earnings 
manipulation (Xie, 2001). 
 
2.2 – Market participants and earnings persistence  
 
Mishkin (1983) tests market efficiency by comparing the relevant pricing factors 
of a security at time t with the rational t+1 forecasts of these variables. The assumption 
underlying it, is that it is not possible to extrapolate abnormal returns using past infor-
mation, if the market participants are rational. Later, Sloan (1996) discovered, in the 
U.S., the Accrual´s Anomaly. After Sloan (1996), other authors used the Mishkin test to 
assess market efficiency (Pincus et al., 2007; Soares & Stark, 2011). Nevertheless, the 
test has its flaws. Pope (2001) suggests that the earnings forecast equation should be 
decomposed into two, accrual equation and cash flow equation, to avoid the “noise” 
from omitted variables, Kothari, Sabino, and Zach (2005) advises for its sensitiveness 
9 
 
when treating extreme observations and (Kraft, Leone, & Wasley, 2007) warns for po-
tential survivorship bias due to the obligation of having t+1 earnings.  
The market-based accounting research has focused on examining the relative per-
sistence and pricing of both the accruals and cash flows since the pivot paper was pub-
lished. Sloan (1996) document an accounting-base anomaly in the U.S. This important 
finding, the so-called Accrual´s Anomaly, directly tests capital market efficiency con-
sidering the publicly available information (Doukakis & Papanastasopoulos, 2014). This 
anomaly consists of a negative correlation between earnings and future stock returns, 
and as the name suggests, specifically on the accrual component of earnings. More spe-
cifically, Sloan (1996) documents a negative relationship between the accrual compo-
nent and future stock returns. In other words, the higher the accrual magnitude is, in 
respect to earnings performance, the lower is the likelihood of the earnings being persis-
tence, whilst a higher magnitude of cash flows in respect to earnings performance re-
lates to a more likely persistence. With this miscalculation, in the future when the com-
panies release their annual reports, previously those companies who had high accruals 
embedded on their earnings will turn out to have negative returns, whereas companies 
who previously had low accruals embedded on their earnings will turn out to have ab-
normal positive returns. Later Richardson et al. (2005) rated accruals by its accounting 
reliability and the results suggest that not only by having high accruals embedded on 
earnings lead to a lower earning persistence, but the greater the quantity of less reliable 
accruals incorporated in the accrual component, the more it will contribute to emphasize 
the lower earnings persistence attributable to the accrual element. This inability and 
misjudgment shown by market participants can be interpreted as investors are irrational 
forecasters (Soares & Stark, 2011), as they seem unable to understand the different per-
sistence associated with each of the two components, consequently overestimating the 
accrual persistence and underweighting the cash flow persistence (Hanlon 2005). This 
behavior is consistent with earnings fixation hypothesis, thus leading to the creation of a 
mispricing tendency that will result in overpricing stocks with high accruals and under-
pricing stocks with low accruals (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005; Sloan, 
1996). As we can observe, investors’ decisions based on earnings information may be 
biased for two main reasons. First, as mentioned before, there is the possibility of earn-
ing´s manipulation by opportunistic managers. Second, investors may lack the 
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knowledge to associate a different persistence to each of the earning’s components 
(Borges, 2015). 
After Sloan (1996) discovering the Accrual´s Anomaly, many researchers have 
shown interest in this research field. LaFond (2005) proposes the Accrual´s Anomaly as 
a global phenomenon by finding evidence in several countries. Regarding the specific 
case of the U.K., Pincus et al. (2007) document evidence towards the U.K. being one of 
the countries in which the Accrual´s Anomaly appears to be more intense. On the other 
hand Soares and Stark (2009) shows evidence that partially contradicts the Accrual´s 
Anomaly in the U.K., having found lack of the phenomenon´s intensity, suggesting it 
only exists in small companies. In follow-up research, Soares and Stark (2011) corrobo-
rates with his previous paper by finding little evidence on the existence of the Accrual´s 
Anomaly, nonetheless they have found signs of a Cash Flow´s Anomaly. More recently, 
Doukakis and Papanastasopoulos (2014) found evidence of mispricing, consistent with 
the Accruals Anomaly´s existence. The justifications for these mixed results can be the 
attributed to the different samples used, the years of study and by the mandatory regula-
tory interventions. 
 In October 1992 the Financial Reporting Standard No. 3: Reporting Financial 
Performance (FRS3) was introduced with the objective to reduce earnings management. 
Chan, Lee, and Lin (2009) studied the impact of the FRS3 and their results propose the 
Accrual´s Anomaly in the U.K. is stronger pre-FRS3 and gets less intense post-FRS3 
implementation. The overall inference is the improvement of reported earnings quality 
post-FRS3 resulted in the reduction of managerial discretionary effects leading inves-
tors to obtain a more accurate value of accruals. Overall, if there are differences in the 
pricing of earnings components of family and non-family firms, it may suggest inves-
tor´s judgment of family firms may be more likely to be attributable to the alignment 
hypothesis or the entrenchment hypothesis.  
 
 
 
11 
 
2.3 – Industry earnings and its components 
 
 King (1966) found evidence of the association between earnings and the industry 
where the company is inserted. In agreement with King (1966), Brown and Ball (1967) 
and Magee (1974) document evidence on the association between the release of indus-
try-level news and the variability of firm´s earnings. Consistent with these previous 
findings, Lev (1983) showed there is a high degree of association between earnings per-
sistence and industry competition. More recently Hui et al. (2016) found a higher persis-
tence associated with the industry-wide earnings and a lower persistence attributable to 
firm-specific earnings. Based on the evidence provided by these authors, for our re-
search we expected the industry-wide earnings to be lesser mispriced than firm-specific 
earnings and we want to observe if there are differences between family firms and non-
family firms. In other words, we want to test if in the U.K. market, by separating the 
sample into family firms and non-family firms, there is significant differences on the 
pricing  of earnings at the industry level.  
 
2.4 – Ownership structure and family firm’s performance 
 
Family firms have a vital role in the society (Che & Langli, 2015) and, as the 
name suggests, they are directly related with the firm´s ownership structure. In the liter-
ature, different authors refer typical characteristics of family firms, such as their pre-
dominance in both private and public sectors (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003), most 
are private companies (Che & Langli, 2015) and are on average smaller (Lins et al., 
2013). Notwithstanding, authors use different considerations on the definition of family 
firms. To be considered a family firm, authors highlight distinctive features such, a fam-
ily must have an ownership stake in the company (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Burkart et 
al., 2003; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004), must have family members belonging to the 
board (Chrisman et al., 2004; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), the successor must be chosen 
inside family (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman et al., 2004), the CEO must be the 
founder or a family member (McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001).  
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Apart from these slightly different definitions on the family firm concept, there is 
a big discussion on how firm performance is affected by the ownership structure of the 
firm (James, 1999). Two competing theories on firm´s ownership and earnings quality 
emerge, the entrenchment hypothesis and the alignment hypothesis. Chandler Jr (1990) 
proposes underperformance and the counter-narrative is driven by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). On the one hand the entrenchment hypothesis is based on earnings manipula-
tion, on the creation of incentives for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth 
from minority´s and on the predictability that corporate assets managed by owner-
manager can be less valuable (Morck et al., 1988). On the other hand, the alignment 
hypothesis suggest the closer the owner and the management is, the less incentives to 
expropriate exists (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), owner management shows converge of 
interests (Morck et al., 1988), have incentives to report earnings in good faith and own-
ers may monitor more effectively than a non-family professional executive because it 
may damage the family’s reputation, wealth, and long-term firm performance (Wang, 
2006). The Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is based on the existence of con-
flict of interests (agency problems) and is used by authors as one of the pillars when it 
comes to argument the alignment hypothesis of family firms. The idea is, owner-
managed firms should take insignificant to low agency costs since it is expected to exist 
an alignment of interests, whereas firms having managers acting as the representative of 
the principal should suffer from higher agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This is 
often applied to family firms because family members should be altruistic towards each 
other, leading to lower agency costs (Chrisman et al., 2004). Another reasoning is pro-
posed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who argue that 
concentrated corporate ownership leads to better corporate governance. Subsequently 
family firms are expected to be subject to less agency costs. Agreeing with this rational, 
Morck and Yeung (2003) argue the more equity in the firm a manager holds, the less 
likely is of taking actions that may prejudice the value of its shares. This leads to the 
view that narrowly held firms may reduce agency problems since the ownership of the 
firm is less widely distributed. Contrary to this view, Chandler Jr (1990) proposes that 
family firms suffer from managerial inefficiencies and it may affect the competitiveness 
of the firm. Other arguments used to justify family firms underperformance are, the en-
trenchment of ineffective managers suggested by Morck et al. (1988), the “free riding” 
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proposed by Bruce and Waldman (1990) and predatory managers by Morck and Yeung 
(2003). 
Figure 1 sums the theoretical arguments for supporting the entrenchment hypothe-
sis and the alignment hypothesis.   
 
Figure 1: Relative (dis)advantage of family control1 
 
Classical Public Corporation Family Firm 
W
ea
k
n
es
se
s Quadrant I Quadrant II 
Aggravated Principal-Agent Agency Problems 
due to Uninvolved Owners 
Aggravated Principal-Principal Agency Problems 
due to Concentrated Ownership 
 
Less Professional Management due to Retention of 
Family Control  
S
tr
en
g
th
s Quadrant III Quadrant IV 
Reduced Principal-Principal Agency Problems 
due to Dispersion of Ownership 
Reduced Principal-Agent Agency Problems due to 
Unified Ownership and Control 
More Professional Management through Exter-
nal Recruiting 
Development of Valuable Capabilities due to 
Stewardly Managers 
 
As we can observe, the ownership structure is a widely studied topic and in the 
specific case of family firms’ performance we detect, different conclusions. Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) suggest that family firms perform at least as well as non-family firms 
and, agreeing with this rational; Wang (2006) finds that family ownership, on average, 
is associated with higher earnings quality; Chrisman et al. (2004) finds, family firms 
suffer indeed less agency costs; and Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007) corroborates 
by suggesting family firms face less severe agency problems derived by a poorer oppor-
tunistic behavior from managers, leading to a lower chance of earnings manipulation. 
Nevertheless, Lins et al. (2013) propose family firms underperform significantly and 
this result is aggravated during crisis periods due to investment cuts. Many authors stud-
ied family firm´s performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman et al., 2004; Lins et 
al., 2013; McConaughy et al., 2001; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and have achieved wide-
ly divergent results which might be explained by the timeframe used, different sample 
sizes and performance measures (Dyer, 2006). This is intriguing because if managers 
from family firms are less opportunistic, the accrual component should be more accu-
                                                 
1 The table was retrieved from Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic, and Heugens (2015, p. 5)  
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rate thus, earnings will reflect better the firms’ performance, therefore leading to a high-
er earnings quality, which posteriorly will lead to more accurate forecasts. Following 
this rationality, Ali et al. (2007) remarks that family firms compared to non-family firms 
were found to have a lower dispersion of analyst forecasts and smaller forecast errors. It 
seems important and interesting to study this topic because there is lack of evidence 
regarding the differences on the accrual component between family and non-family 
firms plus there is a non-existing consensus regarding the firm performance and owner-
ship structure. In the case of the U.K. there is mixed evidence on the Accrual´s Anomaly 
which motivates the analysis of earning´s pricing. 
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3 – Development of Hypothesis 
 
On the premise that the market has some level of inefficiency (Fama, 1970) and 
investors are irrational forecasters (Soares & Stark, 2011) as they seem unable of under-
standing the different persistence associated with each of reported earnings’ compo-
nents, leading to the creation of a mispricing that resulted in overpricing stocks with 
high accruals and underpricing stocks with low accruals (Richardson et al., 2005; Sloan, 
1996). It is pertinent, since we find little evidence combining investors’ forecasting abil-
ity and family firms. Thus, it is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 1: There are no differences in the pricing of the earnings components 
between family and non-family firms. 
On the premise that economic theory suggests the industry component of earnings 
to be more persistence (Brown & Ball, 1967; Hui et al., 2016; King, 1966; Magee, 
1974) we intend to study if there are differences in the industry-wide earnings between 
non-family and family firms. It is pertinent, since we find little evidence combining 
family firms and industry earnings. Thus, it is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 2: There are no differences in the pricing of industry earnings and in-
dustry components between family and non-family firms. 
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4 – Sample, methodology and variable creation 
 
4.1 –  Sample 
 
The sample´s period is 8 years, starting in 2006 until 2013. For our sample selec-
tion we follow Lins et al. (2013). The data collection follows four steps: (1) the required 
accounting information is collected from Worldscope database obtaining a total of 
52,954 firm-year observations. We then deleted all nonfinancial companies listed in the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE), being those with ICBIC datatype 8000 such as 8300 
(Banks), 8500 (Insurance), 8600 (Real Estate) and 8700 (Financial Services), due to 
their different regulatory and operating environments. Together with the exclusion of 
firm year observations from years pre-2006, we archived a total of 11,981 firm-year 
observations. (2) The previously collected data is then merged with DataStream data-
base keeping only those which have industry information, dropping a total of 67 firm-
year observations from the sample. (3) We then proceed to the next sample merge, con-
sidering the monthly report date plus four months using annual returns. We reach 
10,553 firm-year observations. (4) Afterwards we separate the sample into family-firms 
and non-family firms, through Amadeus database, more specifically with the Family 
Firms Classification. We make this separation, considering a firm as a family firm if the 
family has an equity stake of 25 % or more in the company. To this point, our sample is 
composed by 9,454 (89.59%) non-family firms firm-year observations and 1,099 
(10.41%) family firms firm-year observations. Then, we deleted all firm-year observa-
tions containing missing values in the used variables. We obtained a final sample of 
8,545 firm-year observations, composed by 7,662 (89.67%) of non-family firms, and 
883 (10.33%) of family firms.   
After assembling our sample we follow Pincus et al. (2007) empirical methodolo-
gy for abnormal returns. For the calculation of the earnings and, subsequently, earnings 
components, we follow Botsari and Meeks (2008) earnings’ decomposing method 
through the cash flow statement. Later, to test for industry, we decompose earnings into 
industry-wide and firm-specific earnings following and Hui et al. (2016). Our dependent 
variable is abnormal returns in t+1. Our independent variables are earnings, accruals, 
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cash flows, industry-wide earnings, firm-specific earnings, industry-wide accruals, in-
dustry-wide cash flows, firm-specific accruals, firm-specific cash flows and a set of risk 
control variables, firm size, book-to-market and research and development expenses. 
 
4.2 – Methodology 
 
The methodology used in this paper follows Pincus et al. (2007) for the equation 
of abnormal returns, in which we create different deciles for all our independent varia-
bles. We start by decomposing earnings into its components, accruals and cash flows, 
following Botsari and Meeks (2008) method via cash flow statement. Next we calculate 
the industry-wide earnings and firm-specific earnings following Hui et al. (2016) meth-
odology. Afterwards, we proceed to the separation of the components of industry-wide 
earnings and firm-specific earnings obtaining industry-wide accruals and cash flows and 
firm-specific accruals and cash flows, respectively. Next, after assembling these varia-
bles, we calculate scaled-decile rankings for each variable of firm i for each year of the 
sample (accruals, cash flows, industry earnings, firm-specific earnings, industry-wide 
accruals, industry-wide cash flows, firm-specific accruals, firm-specific cash flows) 
with the intent to observe the possible differences between family and non-family firms. 
Following Pincus et al. (2007), we ranked them by year from zero to nine and divided 
the decile number by 9 to set each firm-year observation with a value between zero and 
one. According to Pincus et al. (2007), the estimated coefficients would be similar to a 
return strategy where investors would go long (short) on that particular variable used in 
the model.  
In equations (1a) and (1b), we model abnormal returns as a function of accounting 
components and other relevant variables, where the superscript dec indicates a trans-
formation of the variable to a scaled-decile variable ranging from zero to one.  
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𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅&𝐷_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 
+ 𝜀𝑡+1 
(
1a) 
  
𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑀_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅&𝐷_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1 
(1b) 
 
Where: 
ARt+1 : Abnormal return in year t+1; 
Earn_dect : Earnings decile in year t; 
IndE_dect : Industry-wide earnings decile in year t; 
FirmE_dect : Firm-specific earnings decile in year t; 
Size_dect : Size decile in year t; 
BM_dect : Book-to-Market decile in year t; and 
R&D_dect : Research and development decile in year t. 
 
Afterwards we decomposed earnings into its elements2, and we substitute earnings 
from our model (Earn) by the accrual component (ACC) and the cash flow component 
(CF) obtaining the model 2a. In model 2b we added the industry earnings components3, 
the industry-wide accruals (IndACC) and the industry-wide cash flows (IndCF), the 
firm-specific accruals (FirmACC) and the firm-specific cash flows (FirmCF). 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑀_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅&𝐷_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1  
(2a) 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐶𝐹_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐹_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅&𝐷_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+  𝜀𝑡+1 
(2b) 
 
 
                                                 
2 The accruals and cash flows were calculated following Botsari and Meeks (2008) cash flow 
statement approach. 
3  The industry components were calculated following Hui, Nelson et al. (2016). 
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Where: 
ACC_dect : Accruals decile in year t;  
CF_dect : Cash flows decile in year t; 
IndACC_dect : Industry accruals decile in year t;  
IndCF_dect : Industry cash flows decile in year t. 
FirmACC_dect : Firm-specific accruals decile in year t; and 
FirmCF_dect : Firm-specific cash flows decile in year t. 
 
Then we introduce to our model family variables. In model 3a we added family 
earnings (Earn_fd). In model 3b we add industry-wide earnings of family firms (In-
dE_fd) and firm-specific earnings of family firms (FirmE_fd). 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝑓𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑀_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅&𝐷_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1 
(3a) 
  
𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸_𝑓𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸_𝑓𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑅&𝐷_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1 
(
(3b) 
 
In model 4a we introduced family accruals (ACC_fd) and cash flows (CF_fd).  In 
model 4b we added the industry-wide accruals (IndACC_fd), industry-wide cash flows 
(IndCF_fd), firm-specific accruals (FirmACC_fd) and firm-specific cash flows 
(FirmCF_fd). 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑓𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹_𝑓𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅&𝐷_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1   
(4a) 
  
𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐶𝐹_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐹_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑓𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐶𝐹_𝑓𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑓𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐹_𝑓𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐵𝑀_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅&𝐷_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1 
(4b) 
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4.3 – Variables specification 
 
4.3.1 – Dependent variable 
 
Following previous literature (Pincus et al., 2007), we model abnormal returns as 
follows: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 =   𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 
 
ARt+1 represents the difference between the raw returns of company i, at time t and 
the size-based return for the firm matched decile at time t. It is measured four months 
after the fiscal year end. Annual returns are measured as: 
 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 +12 − 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 
 
 
Return Index t+12 represents Datastream RI datatype. For the Size Portfolio Re-
turn, at the end of each month t-1, firms were assigned to size-based deciles, and the 
matched size decile average of the portfolio firms for the following twelve months, 
were used as the benchmark returns (see, for example, Soares and Stark (2009) for an 
implementation of this risk control approach).  
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4.3.2 – Independent variables 
 
4.3.2.1 – Earnings 
 
We start by measuring earnings according to Botsari and Meeks (2008). Calculat-
ed as follows:  
 
 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑁𝐼
𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
The variable Earni,j,t regards earnings for firm i, in industry j at year t. NI repre-
sents the Net Income (Worldscope 04001). On the denominator, Avg Total Assets, is 
calculated by the average between Total Assets (Worldscope 02999) in year t and t+1. 
 
4.3.2.2 – Earning´s components, accruals and cash flows 
 
The calculation of the cash flows (CFt) and accruals (ACCt) is done according to 
Botsari and Meeks (2008).  
 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑁𝐼 − (𝐹𝑂 + 𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐴)
𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
The variable ACCt represents accruals for firm i in year t. NI represents the Net 
Income (Worldscope 04001), FO represents Funds from Operations (Worldscope 
04201) and FOOA represents Funds from/for Other Operating Activities (Worldscope 
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04831). On the denominator, Avg Total Assets, is calculated by the average between 
Total Assets (Worldscope 02999) in year t and t+1. 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐹𝑂 + 𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐴
𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
The variable CFt corresponds to the cash flows for firm i in year t. FO represents 
Funds from Operations (Worldscope 04201) and FOOA represents Funds from/for Oth-
er Operating Activities (Worldscope 04831). On the denominator, Avg Total Assets, is 
calculated by the average between Total Assets (Worldscope 02999) n year t and t+1. 
 
4.3.2.3 – Industry-wide earnings and firm-specific earnings 
 
Following the methodology used in Hui et al. (2016) we decomposed earnings into in-
dustry-wide earnings and firm-specific earnings.    
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑗,𝑡 =
1
𝑁
𝛴𝑖
𝑁   𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑗,𝑡 
 
The variable IndEj,t  represents industry-wide earnings for industry j at year t. Af-
ter calculating the industry-wide earnings, we can obtain the firm-specific earnings. 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑗 
 
The variable FirmEi,j,t  represents firm-specific earnings for firm i, in industry j at 
year t.  
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4.3.2.4 – Industry-wide and firm-specific earnings components 
 
 Further decomposing, as suggested in Hui et al. (2016), the industry-wide earn-
ings (IndEt) become industry-wide accruals (IndACCt) and industry-wide cash flow 
(IndCFt). 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑗,𝑡) 
 
The variable IndACCt represents industry-wide accruals for all firms in industry j 
in year t.  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐶𝐹𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑗,𝑡 
 
The variable IndCFt represents industry-wide cash flows for all firms in industry j 
at time t. 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 
 
The variable FirmACCi,t represents firm-specific cash flows of firm i in year t.  
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 
 
The variable FirmCFi,t represents firm-specific cash flows of firm i, in year t.  
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4.2.3 – Family firm variables 
 
After calculating these previously mentioned variables, it is important to differen-
tiate family firms from non-family firms. We created a dummy variable that would ef-
fectively separate family firm’s observations from other firms, leading to the creation of 
the variable family. We considered a firm as a family firm if the family had a 25% or 
higher equity stake. Being the family (fd) a binary variable in which 0 means non-family 
and 1 means family, we multiplied each of the previously calculated variables by it to 
obtain family firm’s results. This lead to the following variable construction: 
 
Where:  
Earn_fdt : Earn*fd; 
ACC_fdt : ACC*fd; 
CF_fdt  : Earn*fd; 
IndE_fdt  : IndE*fd; 
IndACC_fdt : IndACC*fd; 
IndCF_fdt : IndCF*fd; 
FirmCF_fdt : FirmCF*fd; and 
FirmACC_fdt : FirmACC*fd. 
 
4.2.4 – Creation of deciles 
 
After the variables assemblage, we then created a decile4 variable for each of the 
variables. 
 
Where:  
Earn_dect : earnings decile in year t; 
ACC_dect : accruals decile in year t; 
CF_dect : cash flow decile in year t; 
                                                 
4  The decile variables were created using Stata command xtile. 
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IndE_dect : industry earnings decile in year t; 
IndACC_dect : industry accruals decile in year t; 
IndCF_dect : industry cash flows decile in year t; 
FirmE_dect : firm-specific earnings decile in year t; 
FirmACC_dect : firm-specific accruals decile in year t; and 
FirmCF_dect : firm-specific cash flows decile in year t. 
 
Regarding family firms, we multiplied the above-mentioned deciles by family. 
 
Where: 
Earn_dec_fdt : Earn_dec*fd; 
ACC_fd_dect : Acc_dec*fd; 
CF_dec_fdt : CF_dec*fd; 
IndE_dec_fdt : IndE_dec*fd; 
IndACC_dec_fdt : IndACC_dec*fd; 
IndCF_dec_fdt : IndCF_dec*fd; 
FirmE_fd_dect : FirmE_dec*fd; 
FirmACC_fd_dect : FirmACC_dec*fd; and 
FirmCF_fd_dect : FirmCF_dec*fd. 
 
Also, we created risk variables such as size decile (Size_dec) book-to-market dec-
ile (BM_dec) and research and development decile (R&D_dec). In the current literature, 
the use of these variables is suggested because they are likely to be useful in earnings’ 
forecast (see Soares and Stark (2009)). 
 To calculate the book-to-market decile we used the following formula: 
 
 𝐵𝑀_𝑑𝑒𝑐 =  
𝑇𝑆𝐸
𝑀𝐶
 
 
Where TSE represents the Total shareholder´s Equity (Worldscope 03995) and 
MC represents the Market Capitalization in the Fiscal Period End (Worldscope 08002). 
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To calculate research and development decile variable, we used the following 
formula:  
 
𝑅&𝐷_𝑑𝑒𝑐 =  
𝑅&𝐷
𝑀𝐶
 
 
Where R&D accounts for Research & Development Expense (Worldscope 01201), 
and MC represents the Market Capitalization in the Fiscal Period End (Worldscope 
08002). 
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5 – Results 
 
In this section, we present the sample composition, mean statistics, the correla-
tions and the regression results. On panel A of table 1, we can see the distribution of the 
sample per year. Each year embodies a range of the sample firm-year observations be-
tween 10.93% and 14.27%. In the case of family firms, we see that each year represents 
between 9.06% and 15.63%. On panel B of table 1, we see the distribution of the sam-
ple across industries. Each industry represents between 0.42% to 24.70% of the sample. 
Regarding family firms, each industry represents between 0.23% to 26.27%. 
 
Table 1: Sample composition  
Panel A: Sample by year 
Year Firm-year observations % Family 
Firms 
% 
2006 1,219 14.27 103 11.66 
2007 1,204 14.09 109 12.34 
2008 1,145 13.40 138 15.63 
2009 1,070 12.52 127 14.38 
2010 1,028 12.03   80   9.06 
2011    999 11.69   95 10.76 
2012    946 11.07 112 12.68 
2013    934 10.93 119 13.48 
Total years 8,545 100.00 883 100.00 
 
Panel B: Sample by industry 
ICBSSC Industry Sector 
Name 
Firm-year observations % Family 
Firms 
% 
500 Oil & Gas    767    8.98   38   4.30 
1300 Chemicals    140    1.64     3   0.34 
1700 Basic Resources    931  10.90    71   8.04 
2300 Construction & Materials    249    2.91    32   3.62 
2700 Industrial Goods & Services 2,111  24.70  232 26.27 
3300 Automobiles & Parts      36    0.42      2   0.23 
3500 Food & Beverage    263    3.08    17   1.93 
3700 Personal & Household Goods    443    5.18    66   7.47 
4500 Health Care    664    7.77    50   5.66 
5300 Retail    436    5.10    46   5.21 
5500 Media    626    7.33    83   9.40 
5700 Travel & Leisure    526    6.16    69   7.81 
6500 Telecommunications    131    1.53    24   2.72 
7500 Utilities    161    1.88    14   1.59 
9500 Technology 1,061  12.42  136  15.40 
All industries 
 
8,545 100.00  883 100.00 
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Panel A, B and C provide data for all firms, 
family firms and non-family firms respectively. On average, both family and non-family 
have negative earnings, accruals and cash flows. At industry level, on average, we ob-
serve for both family and non-family negative industry-wide earnings, accruals and cash 
flows, and positive firm-specific earnings, accruals and cash flows.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Earn_t is earnings for year t, defined as Net Income (Worldscope 04001) scaled by average Total Assets (Worldscope 02999). CFt is cash flow for year 
t defined as Funds from Operations (Worldscope 04201) plus Funds from/for Other Operating Activities (Worldscope 04831) scaled by Total Assets 
(Worldscope 02999). ACCt is the result between the sum of Net Income (Worldscope 04001) minus Funds from Operations (Worldscope 04201) minus 
Panel A: All firms (8,545 annual firm-year observations) 
Variable  Mean  Std. dev.  P10  P90 
Earnt  -0.087   0.701  -0.415   0.168 
ACCt  -0.065   0.571  -0.212   0.077 
CFt  -0.021   0.363  -0.258   0.188 
IndEt  -0.126   0.154  -0.301  -0.014 
IndACCt  -0.086   0.105  -0.158  -0.021 
IndCFt  -0.040   0.106  -0.164   0.037 
FirmEt   0.040   0.700  -0.262   0.338 
FirmACCt   0.021   0.571  -0.140   0.195 
FirmCFt   0.184   0.362  -0.205   0.254 
 
Panel B: Family firms (883 annual firm-year observations) 
Variable  Mean 
 
Std. dev. 
 
P10 
 
P90 
Earnt  -0.059   0.635  -0.288   0.202 
ACCt  -0.049   0.367   0.180   0.099 
CFt  -0.010   0.490  -0.198   0.217 
IndEt  -0.110   0.153  -0.264  -0.002 
IndACCt  -0.083   0.112  -0.134  -0.003 
IndCFt  -0.026   0.105  -0.139   0.039 
FirmEt   0.050   0.646  -0.181   0.358 
FirmACCt   0.034   0.378  -0.128   0.212 
FirmCFt   0.015   0.494  -0.190   0.274 
 
Panel C: Non-family firms (7,662 annual firm-year observations) 
Variable  Mean  Std. dev.  P10  P90 
Earnt  -0.090   0.709  -0.426     0.1611 
ACCt  -0.067   0.590  -0.215   0.073 
CFt  -0.023   0.345  -0.264   0.183 
IndEt  -0.128   0.154  -0.301  -0.014 
IndACCt  -0.867   0.104  -0.162  -0.021 
IndCFt  -0.041   0.106  -0.168   0.037 
FirmEt   0.038   0.706  -0.271   0.335 
FirmACCt   0.020   0.589  -0.141   0.194 
FirmCFt   0.019   0.344  -0.207   0.251 
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Funds from/for Other Operating Activities (Worldscope 04831) scaled by Total Assets (Worldscope 02999). IndEt is industry-wide earnings for year t, 
defined as average Earnt across sample firms in the same ICBSSC industry. IndACCt is the industry-wide accruals for year t, defined as IndEt minus 
IndCFt. IndCFt is the industry-wide cash flows for year t, defined as the average CFt across firms in the same ICBCCS industry. FirmE_dect is firm-
specific earnings decile for firm i, in industry j for year t, defined as the difference between Earnt and IndEt. FirmACCt is firm-specific accruals for 
year t, defined as FirmEt  minus FirmCFt. FirmCFt is firm-specific cash flows for year t, defined as CFt minus IndCFt.  
 
In table 3 we observe the correlation coefficient between the variables used in this 
work. We can see differences between the Pearson and Spearman correlation coeffi-
cients which may indicate the influence of extreme observations. 
 
Table 3: Correlations between independent variables 
Panel A: Pearson correlation 
     
 
Earnt ACCt CFt IndEt IndACCt  IndCFt  FirmEt FirmACCt  FirmCFt 
Earnt 1 
        ACCt  0.8743 1 
       CFt  0.5580  0.0850 1 
      IndEt  0.1246  0.0451  0.1787 1 
     IndACCt   0.1292  0.1012  0.0923  0.7272 1 
    IndCFt   0.0535 -0.0344  0.1686  0.7348  0.0689 1 
   FirmEt  0.9764  0.8675  0.5211 -0.0926 -0.0286 -0.1064 1 
  FirmACCt   0.8533  0.9843  0.0688 -0.0839 -0.0761 -0.0467  0.8746 1 
 FirmCFt  0.5442  0.0960  0.9529 -0.0466  0.0715 -0.1385  0.5563  0.0835  1 
           Panel B: Spearman correlation 
 
Earnt ACCt CFt IndEt IndACCt  IndCFt  FirmEt FirmACCt  FirmCFt 
Earnt 1 
        ACCt  0.4982 1 
       CFt  0.7548 -0.0429 1 
      IndEt  0.2723  0.1426  0.2433 1 
     IndACCt   0.2296  0.1597  0.1661  0.6789 1 
    IndCFt   0.2366  0.0914  0.2399  0.8317  0.2615 1 
   FirmEt  0.7701  0.4161  0.5790 -0.2713 -0.1763 -0.2243 1 
  FirmACCt   0.3531  0.8075 -0.0980 -0.2020 -0.3358 -0.0474 0.5288 1 
 FirmCFt  0.6057 -0.0706  0.8223 -0.1735  0.0349 -0.2507 0.7246 -0.0598   1 
Notes: Bold type indicates significance at the 5% level or better 
 
We will now present the regression results. Similar to Sloan (1996) we want to 
test if there is mispricing of earnings and its components. Our strategy relies on the con-
struction of yearly basis deciles rankings for each of the independent variables. Follow-
ing Fama and French (1998) and Pincus et al. (2007) we model t+1 abnormal returns 
with the following variables, earnings (Earn_dec) and its components (ACC_dec and 
CF_dec), firm size (Size_dec), book-to-market (BM_dec). We incorporate in the model 
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the variable research and development (R&D_dec), the industry-wide earnings (In-
dE_dec) and its components (IndACC_dec and IndCF_dec), firm-specific earnings 
(FirmE_dec) and its components (FirmACC_dec and FirmCF_dec). The results are 
shown in table 4. 
According to Pincus et al. (2007), the coefficients provide the marginal return in a 
strategy that will be short (long) in a certain variable. For instance, if accruals have a 
negative (positive) coefficient it would be interpreted as an overpricing (underpricing) 
of the information contained in accruals. The evidence presented in panel A suggest 
underpricing of earnings, in other words we find evidence in which an underweighting 
strategy would earn a yearly abnormal return of 1%. The evidence presented in panel B 
does not provide any statistically significant findings. 
 
Table 4: Regression tests of abnormal returns using equation (1a) and (1b) 
Panel A: Equation 1a 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Stat P>|t| 
Intercept -0.106  0.326 -3.25 0.001 *** 
Earn_dect  0.010  0.003  2.84 0.005 *** 
Size_dect  0.009  0.003  2.85 0.004 *** 
BM_dect  0.009  0.003  2.75 0.006 *** 
R&D_dect  0.019  0.007  2.72 0.007 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.006 
Observations 8,545 
 
Panel B: Equation 1b 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Stat P>|t| 
Intercept -0.010  0.378 -2.64  0.008 *** 
IndE_dect  0.003  0.004  0.75  0.455  
FirmE_dect  0.006  0.004  1.56  0.119  
Size_dect  0.010  0.004  3.11  0.002 *** 
BM_dect  0.008  0.004  2.56   0.010 *** 
R&D_dect  0.017  0.007  2.56   0.010 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.006 
Observations 8,545 
In panel A, we present the results of estimating the following abnormal returns regression ARt+1 = β 0 + β1Earn_dect + β2Size_dect + β3BM_dect + 
β4R&D_dect + et+1.  In panel B, we present results of the following regression ARt+1= β0 + β1IndE_dect + β2FirmE_dect + β3Size_dect + β4BM_dect + 
β5R&D_dect + et+1. Earn_dect is earnings decile for year t, defined as Net Income (Worldscope 04001) scaled by average Total Assets (Worldscope 
02999) in t and t+1. IndE_dect is industry-wide earnings decile in year t, defined as average Earnt across sample firms in the same ICBSSC industry. 
FirmE_dect is firm-specific earnings decile for firm i, in industry j for year t, defined as the difference between Earnt and IndEt. Size_dect is size decile 
in year t. BM_dect is book-to-market decile in year t, defined as Total Shareholder´s Equity (Worldscope 03995) scaled by Market Capitalization in the 
Fiscal Period End (Worldscope 08002). R&D_dect is research and development decile in year t, and is defined as R&D Expense (Worldscope 01201) 
scaled by Market Capitalization in the Fiscal Period End (Worldscope 08002). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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On panel A of table 5 we tested for earning´s components. Following Pincus et al. 
(2007) interpretation, we find evidence of cash flow underpricing, in which an under-
weighting strategy would hold yearly abnormal returns of 1.7%. On panel B, we tested 
for industry-wide and firm-specific earnings components. Our findings suggest under-
weighting of firm-specific cash flows in which an underweighting strategy would earn a 
yearly abnormal return of 1.4%. 
 
Table 5: Regression tests of abnormal returns using equation (2a) and (2b) 
Panel A: Equation 2a 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Stat P>|t| 
Intercept -0.121  0.036 -3.37 0.001 *** 
ACC_dect -0.003  0.003 -0.80 0.424  
CF_dect  0.017  0.003  5.07 0.000 *** 
Size_dect  0.008  0.003  2.24 0.025 ** 
BM_dect  0.010  0.003  2.91 0.004 *** 
R&D_dect  0.019  0.007  2.72  0.006 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.009 
Observations 8,545 
 
Panel B: Equation 2b 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Stat P>|t| 
Intercept -0.122  0.046 -2.68 0.007 *** 
IndACC_dect  0.001  0.004 -0.09 0.926  
IndCF_dect  0.003  0.004  0.81 0.416  
FirmACC_dect -0.002  0.004 -0.56 0.575  
FirmCF_dect  0.014  0.035  4.04 0.000 *** 
Size_dect  0.009  0.003  2.58 0.010 *** 
BM_dect  0.009  0.003  2.70 0.007 *** 
R&D_dect  0.018  0.007  2.57 0.010 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.007 
Observations 8,545 
In panel A, we present the results of estimating the following abnormal return regression ARt+1 = β0 + β1ACC_dect + β2CF_dect + β3Size_dect + 
β4BM_dect + β5R&D_dect + et+1. In panel B, we present results of the following regression ARt+1 = β0 + β1IndACC_dect + β2IndCF_dect + 
β3FirmACC_dect + β4FirmCF_dect + β5Size_dect + β6BM_dect + β7R&D_dect + et+1. ACC_dect is accruals decile for year t, defined as Net Income 
(Worldscope 04001) minus Funds from Operations (Worldscope 04201) minus Funds from/for Other Operating Activities (Worldscope 04831) scaled 
by average Total Assets (Worldscope 02999) in t and t+1. CF_dect is cash flow decile for year t, defined as Funds from Operations (Worldscope 
04831) plus Funds from/for Other Operating Activities (Worldscope 04831) scaled by average Total Assets (Worldscope 02999) in t and t+1. In-
dACC_dect is the industry-wide accruals decile in year t, defined as average ACCt across sample firms in the same ICBSSC industry. IndCF_dect is the 
industry-wide cash flows decile in year t and is the difference between IndEt and IndACCt. FirmACC_dect is the firm-specific accruals decile for year t, 
defined as IndEt minus IndCFt. FirmCF_dect is firm-specific cash flows decile for year t, defined as CFt minus IndCFt. Size_dect is size decile in year 
t. BM_dect is book-to-market decile in year t, defined as Total Shareholder´s Equity (Worldscope 03995) scaled by Market Capitalization in the Fiscal 
Period End (Worldscope 08002). R&D_dect is research and development decile in year t, defined as R&D Expense (Worldscope 01201) scaled by 
Market Capitalization in the Fiscal Period End (Worldscope 08002). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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On table 6 we introduce earnings and industry earnings of family firms. Following 
Pincus et al. (2007) interpretation, we find evidence of earnings underpricing, consistent 
with panel A of table 4. We observe the underpricing is only felt in non-family firms 
and by implementing an underweighting strategy would earn a yearly abnormal return 
of 1%. The evidence presented in panel B does not provide any statistically significant 
findings. 
 
Table 6: Regression tests of abnormal returns using equation (3a) and (3b) 
Panel A: Equation 3a 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Stat P>|t| 
Intercept -0.106  0.033 -3.24 0.001 *** 
Earn_dect  0.010  0.003  2.75 0.006 *** 
Earn_fd_dect  0.002  0.003  0.46 0.644 
 Size_dect  0.009  0.003  2.85 0.004 *** 
BM_dect  0.009  0.003  2.74 0.006 *** 
R&D_dect  0.019  0.007  2.73 0.006 *** 
Adjusted R2  0.006 
Observations 8,545 
 
Panel B: Equation 3b 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Stat P>|t| 
Intercept -0.099  0.038 -2.61 0.009 *** 
IndE_dect  0.003  0.004  0.72 0.471  
IndE_fd_dect -0.001  0.007 -0.07 0.945  
FirmE_dect  0.005  0.004  1.40 0.163  
FirmE_fd_dect  0.004  0.006  0.72 0.469  
Size_dect  0.010  0.003  3.11 0.002 *** 
BM_dect  0.008  0.003  2.55 0.011 ** 
R&D_dect  0.018  0.007  2.58 0.010 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.005 
Observations 8,545 
In panel A, we present the results of estimating the following abnormal return regression ARt+1 = β0 + β1Earn_dect + β2Earn_FD_dect + β3Size_dect + 
β4BM_dect + β5R&D_dect + et+1.  In panel B, we present results of the following regression ARt+1= β0 + β1IndE_dect + β2IndE_fd_dect + β3FirmE_dect 
+ β4FirmE_fd_dect + β5Size_dect + β6BM_dect + β7R&D_dect + et+1. Earn_dect is earnings decile for year t, defined as Net Income (Worldscope 
04001) scaled by average Total Assets (Worldscope 02999) in t and t+1. Earn_fd_dect is family´s earnings decile in year t. IndE_dect is industry-wide 
earnings decile in year t, defined as average Earnt across sample firms in the same ICBSSC industry. IndE_fd_dect is family´s industry-wide earnings 
decile in year t. FirmCF_dect is firm-specific cash flows decile for year t, defined as Earn_dec minus IndE_dec. Size_dect is size decile in year t. 
BM_dect is book-to-market decile in year t, defined as Total Shareholder´s Equity (Worldscope 03995) scaled by Market Capitalization in the Fiscal 
Period End (Worldscope 08002). R&D_dect is research and development decile in year t, defined as R&D Expense (Worldscope 01201) scaled by 
Market Capitalization in the Fiscal Period End (Worldscope 08002). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
 
On panel A of table 7 we introduce earnings and industry components of family 
firms. Following Pincus et al. (2007) interpretation, we find evidence of cash flow un-
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derpricing, consistent with panel A of table 5. We observe the underpricing is only felt 
in non-family firms and by implementing an underweighting strategy, would earn year-
ly abnormal returns of 1.7%. Regarding panel B, we find evidence of firm-specific cash 
flows are underpricing, consistent with panel B of table 5. We observe the underpricing 
is only felt in non-family firms and by implementing an underweighting strategy, would 
earn a yearly abnormal return of 1.4%. 
  
Table 7: Regression tests of abnormal returns using equation (4a) and (4b) 
Panel A: Equation 4a     
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Stat P>|t| 
Intercept -0.121  0.360 -3.35 0.001 *** 
ACC_dect -0.003  0.004 -0.95 0.343  
CF_dect  0.017  0.003  4.99 0.000 *** 
ACC_fd_dect  0.005  0.007  0.76 0.446  
CF_fd_dect -0.001  0.006 -0.23 0.820  
Size_dect  0.008  0.003  2.25 0.024 ** 
BM_dect  0.009  0.003  2.90 0.004 *** 
R&D_dect  0.019  0.007  2.73 0.006 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.009 
Observations 8,545 
     
Panel B: Equation 4b     
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Stat P>|t| 
Intercept -0.120  0.046 -2.63 0.008 *** 
IndACC_dect  0.001  0.004  0.06 0.948  
IndCF_dect  0.003  0.004  0.82 0.409  
FirmACC_dect -0.004  0.004 -0.98 0.328  
FirmCF_dect  0.014  0.004  3.97 0.000 *** 
IndACC_fd_dect -0.001  0.008 -0.95 0.343  
IndCF_fd_dect -0.001  0.008 -0.37 0.709  
FirmACC_fd_dect  0.015  0.011  1.33 0.183  
FirmCF_fd_dect  0.001  0.008  0.07 0.942  
Size_dect  0.009  0.003  2.56 0.011 ** 
BM_dect  0.009  0.003  2.70 0.007 *** 
R&D_dect  0.018  0.007  2.58 0.010 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.008 
Observations 8,545 
In panel A, we present the results of estimating the following pricing regression Rt+1 = β0 + β1ACC_dect + β2CF_dect + β3ACC_fd_dect + β4CF_fd_dect 
+ β5Size_dect + β6BM_dect + β7R&D_dect + et. In panel B, we present results of the following regression Rt+1 = β0 + β1IndACC_dect + β2IndCF_dect + 
β3FirmACC_dect + β4FirmCF_dect + β5IndACC_fd_dect + β6IndCF_fd_dect + β7FirmACC_fd_dect + β8FirmCF_fd_dect + β9Size_dect + β10BM_dect 
+ β11R&D_dect + et. ACC_dect is accruals decile for year t, defined as Net Income (Worldscope 04001) minus Funds from Operations (Worldscope 
04201) minus Funds from/for Other Operating Activities (Worldscope 04831) scaled by average Total Assets (Worldscope 02999) in t and t+1. 
CF_dect is cash flow decile for year t defined as Funds from Operations (Worldscope 04831) plus Funds from/for Other Operating Activities 
(Worldscope 04831) scaled by average Total Assets (Worldscope 02999) in t and t+1. ACC_fd_dect is family´s accruals decile for year t. CF_fd_dect is 
family´s cash flow decile for year t. IndACC_dect is the industry-wide accruals decile in year t, defined as average ACCt across sample firms in the 
same ICBSSC industry. IndCF_dect is the industry-wide cash flows decile in year t, defined as the difference between IndEt and IndACCt. Fir-
mACC_dect is the firm-specific accruals decile for year t. FirmCF_dect  is firm-specific cash flows decile for year t. IndACC_fd_dect is the family´s 
industry accruals decile in year t. IndCF_fd_dect is the family´s industry cash flows decile in year t. FirmACC_fd_dec is the family´s firm-specific 
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accruals decile in year t. FirmCF_fd_dec is the family´s firm-specific cash flows decile in year t. Size_dect is size decile in year t. BM_dect is book-to-
market decile in year t, defined as Total Shareholder´s Equity (Worldscope 03995) scaled by Market Capitalization in the Fiscal Period End 
(Worldscope 08002). R&D_dect is research and development decile in year t, defined as R&D Expense (Worldscope 01201) scaled by Market Capitali-
zation in the Fiscal Period End (Worldscope 08002). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respective-
ly. 
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6 – Conclusions 
 
The objective of this research is to evaluate if being a family firm or a non-family 
firm has impact on the price of earnings and earnings components. We follow Pincus et 
al. (2007) to test if it is possible to obtain abnormal returns on an annual basis. We use a 
set of risk controls previously used in the literature by other authors (Fama & French, 
1998; Pincus et al., 2007; Soares & Stark, 2011) for our t+1 abnormal return model. 
Our first research question, was to discover if there are differences in the pricing 
of earnings between family firms and non-family. First, we tested earnings and we 
found evidence of underpricing exclusively on non-family firms. Hence an under-
weighting strategy would earn a yearly abnormal return of 1%. Second, following 
Botsari and Meeks (2008), we decomposed earnings into its components to test for dif-
ferences in the accrual and cash flow components. In the literature some authors suggest 
underpricing of cash flows and overpricing of accruals (Hui et al., 2016; Kraft et al., 
2007). Unlike Pincus et al. (2007) in the U.K., we find evidence of underpricing the 
cash flow component, in which an underweighting strategy would earn a yearly abnor-
mal return of 1.7%, solely concerning non-family firms. Regarding the accrual compo-
nent we did not find evidence of mispricing neither overpricing, suggesting little evi-
dence on the Accrual´s Anomaly. Nonetheless, our findings may suggest the existence 
of a Cash Flow Anomaly as suggested in Soares and Stark (2011). All the mentioned 
results were statistically significant although off small economic meaning. 
Regarding our second research question, which was to discover if there are differ-
ences in the pricing of industry earnings and industry earning´s components between 
family and non-family firms, our results suggest it exists. Unlike Hui et al. (2016), we 
did not find evidence of overpricing firm-specific earnings neither underpricing indus-
try-wide earnings. Contrary to our anticipation, after separating industry-wide earnings 
and firm-specific earnings into their components, we did not find evidence of overpric-
ing firm-specific accruals neither underpricing industry-wide cash flows as suggested 
by Hui et al. (2016). Our evidence suggests underpricing solely for firm-specific cash 
flows of non-family firms. An underweighting strategy would yield a yearly abnormal 
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return of 1.4%. The mentioned results were statistically significant although off small 
economic meaning. 
Given our findings, we suggest further exploring using a wider sample as it is still 
not clear if a mispricing exists on both family and non-family firms. It seems interesting 
to study if in other markets occurs underpricing of earnings, cash flows and firm-
specific cash flows of non-family firms. Furthermore, it may exist an Accrual´s Anoma-
ly or a Cash Flow Anomaly allowing arbitrage opportunities, for firms such as the case 
of the family and non-family firms. 
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